

ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH NEWS

KNOWLEDGE FOR TRANSPARENCY - LINKING ANTI-CORRUPTION RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

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ACRN: MOBILISING GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE AGAINST CORRUPTION

Welcome to the ninth issue of Anti-Corruption Research News. Here you will find recent insights and activities in anti-corruption research, synthesised for scholars, policy-makers and anti-corruption practitioners. This newsletter is part of the Anti-Corruption Research Network (ACRN), an initiative by Transparency International to build a knowledge community and information service for corruption research.

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SHELL COMPANIES AND PUPPET MASTERS

By Jason Sharman*

In a series of fascinating investigative articles, Reuters journalist Brian Grow explains how shell companies can be used in a wide range of illicit financial activities as a fall guy or a decoy, a legal person who can be manipulated without being held accountable.¹ Shell companies can be used in this manner because they are legal persons without any substantive existence - they have no employees and produce no goods or services. Such companies are integral to most instances of large-scale corruption, especially those with an international dimension.

Shell companies can be incredibly useful to those giving or receiving bribes, embezzling public funds, or committing sundry other financial crimes by acting as an intermediary who serves to obscure the identity of the perpetrator. Thus the key to the abuse of shell companies for criminal ends, and efforts to prevent this abuse, is the link between the company and the real person or people in control.

The most systematic exploration of the use

of shell companies in laundering the proceeds of corruption was released late last year by the World Bank as part of the Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative.² *The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It* reaffirms that the crux of the issue is the ability to 'see through' the corporate veil provided by shell companies to identify the controlling party, commonly referred to as the beneficial owner.³

The report provides specific examples and an extensive database of 150 relevant corruption cases, presents evidence from dozens of interviews with representatives from financial services, governments and law enforcement agencies, and provides a reference section on dozens of the various types of corporate vehicles that can be used as shell companies. In doing so, it provides an invaluable resource for anyone interested in examining how corporate vehicles like companies, trusts, and foundations facilitate major corruption. The

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SPOTLIGHT: SHELL COMPANIES AND PUPPET MASTERS



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report then goes on to present various recommendations, generally emphasising better enforcement of international standards that are already on the books, rather than generating a new layer of rules and regulations. This article provides a brief summary and overview of its contents and main recommendations.

How shell companies work

How, specifically, do shell companies aid the corrupt? In its most typical form, a shell company is provided by a professional intermediary to a corrupt party who then uses it to obscure the money trail as the illicit funds in question are transferred into and through bank accounts. Consider the example of the arms company British Aerospace Systems (BAE). In return for highly lucrative arms contracts with Saudi Arabia and a range of other countries, BAE paid large bribes to those awarding the contracts. Yet a direct transfer from the company to the officials in question would be have been extremely suspicious, even to a British government intent on looking the other way. So, instead, BAE often used a middle-man insulated from BAE and the ultimate recipient by two shell companies, one between the middle-man and BAE, the other between the middle-man and the recipient. The financial flows between each link in the chain were dressed up as payments for vague 'consultancy' and 'marketing' services. To prove that a corrupt agreement had been struck, investigating authorities had the very difficult task of following each link in the chain across different jurisdictions to prove that these ostensibly independent parties were in fact all part of the same criminal enterprise.

Key challenges and points of current vulnerability relate to the gaps in the information kept by company registries, the role of professional intermediaries, especially lawyers, and the difficulties faced by investigators in working across borders.

Company registries are the first port of call for investigators, though too often the information held on file there is incomplete, out of date, or, in the case of trusts, which are not registered, entirely absent. Those engaged in major corruption rarely set up these corporate vehicles for themselves, instead they employ the services of a bank or a law or accounting firm. These corporate service providers have too often been negligent, willfully blind, or even actively complicit in laundering the proceeds of corruption. Particularly troubling is the ability to hide financial dealings and stymie investigations under the cover of legal professional privilege (e.g. attorney-client privilege). In some of the provider websites examined for the report this service was an optional extra, sometimes adding \$500 to the cost of a shell company, which usually retail at \$1000-3000.

Complicating matters further, while major corruption cases often have an international dimension, investigators have very little knowledge of corporate vehicles outside their own country, and often lack the resources to obtain evidence from other jurisdictions.

Lack of compliance

A fundamental concern in setting anti-corruption standards in this area is the question of compliance and effectiveness, a recurring theme in the report. Common sense suggests that just because rules are introduced does not mean that anyone is necessarily following them, yet policy-makers and regulators too seldom appreciate this basic fact. To investigate whether the international rules that in theory prohibit those purchasing shell companies from keeping their identity hidden actually work in practice, the report incorporated a 'mystery shopping' exercise, more formally known as an audit study. A variety of characters impersonating publicity and tax-shy consultants (a profile often adopted by corrupt parties a la BAE)

“Key challenges and points of current vulnerability relate to the gaps in the information kept by company registries, the role of professional intermediaries, especially lawyers, and the difficulties faced by investigators in working across borders.”

“[T]he study found that poor countries were significantly more rigorous in applying corporate transparency rules than OECD member states. Another surprise was that tax haven jurisdictions, traditionally associated with tight secrecy and lax regulation, were actually among the best performers in enforcing existing standards.”

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“[The report recommends] better enforcement of international standards relating to financial intermediaries, especially banks, lawyers, and other firms in the business of establishing and selling corporate vehicles. Banks should be held to their obligation of making sure they know who the beneficial owner is behind the corporate vehicles which hold accounts.”

approached those firms who are in the business of setting up shell companies. The key question of interest was what identity documents, if any, the consultants had to supply in order to set up the company. This was done because international standards mandate that all companies must be able to be traced back to the real person or people in control, and thus the providers that form shell companies should collect identification documents to establish the true identity of their customers. The results of the audit study were both surprising and highly illuminating.

The replies from corporate service providers were classified as meeting international standards if they required identity documents (most usually a scanned, authenticated copy of the picture page of a passport) in order for a shell company to be set up, or violating these standards if no such documents were required. Of the 102 replies received, 41 were prepared to provide a company with no identity documentation whatsoever, meaning that the resulting company was the kind of anonymous, untraceable entity so useful for making, receiving or laundering corrupt payments.

Even more interesting was the pattern of compliance and non-compliance among different types of countries. Previous work by the International Monetary Fund suggested that rich countries have both more incentive and greater means with which to implement financial regulations. Yet the study found that poor countries were significantly more rigorous in applying corporate transparency rules than OECD member states. Another surprise was that tax haven jurisdictions, traditionally associated with tight secrecy and lax regulation, were actually among the best performers in enforcing existing standards. The final counter-intuitive finding was that the United States was by far the worst performer, as 24 out of 27 American providers were content to sell a company without performing any customer due diligence.

The way forward

The *Puppet Masters* report attempts to strike a balance between those who want tougher regulations to prevent the misuse of corporate vehicles for corruption, even if it imposed a heavier regulatory burden, versus others who

prioritised ease of doing business, given that the large majority of companies and trusts are used for legitimate business reasons. Those in favour of the toughest standards suggested that the identity of all beneficial owners of companies and key personnel in trusts (which do not have owners as such) should be publicly available. This complete corporate transparency would indeed make it much harder to launder proceeds of corruption via corporate vehicles. However, from a practical point of view, company registries are currently completely unequipped to play such a role, and are unlikely to receive the resources necessary to bring such an ambitious target within reach. If this is true for the cash-strapped governments of Europe and the United States, it is all the more so for the authorities in developing countries who are already struggling to implement the complex array of global financial standards they have had little say in creating.

Company registries aside, the main recommendations of the report emphasise better enforcement of international standards relating to financial intermediaries, especially banks, lawyers, and other firms in the business of establishing and selling corporate vehicles. Banks should be held to their obligation of making sure they know who the beneficial owner is behind the corporate vehicles which hold accounts. Governments should clarify the scope of legal professional privilege: does it apply to every interaction between a lawyer and a client, including every financial transaction, or is more restricted? Those forming shell companies, trusts and so on should be required to collect documentation on the identity of the beneficial owner for all the vehicles they create, and make this available to law enforcement on request. Finally, investigators need to have greater knowledge of the different kinds of corporate vehicles available in foreign countries, and their licit and illicit uses in order to increase the chance of following the money trail in major corruption cases. The *Puppet Masters* report itself is the best possible starting point for remedying the current knowledge deficit in this area.

References

1. B. Grow, “Special Report: A Little House of Secrets on the Great Plains.”, *Reuters*, June 28, 2011 [online] Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/28/us-usa-shell-companies-idUSTRE75R20Z20110628>
2. The Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative is a joint program by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank which targets financial centres that play host to the proceeds of grand corruption. For more information, please see: http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/
3. E. Willebois et al., *The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2011) [online] Available at: http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/documents/Puppet%20Masters%20Report.pdf

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HIGHLIGHTS IN CORRUPTION RESEARCH

MEASURING CORRUPTION

Global Right to Information Rating

Access Info Europe & Centre for Law and Democracy, 2011

The Right to Information (RTI) rating covers 89 countries around the world. The central idea behind the Rating is to provide RTI advocates, reformers, legislators and others with a reliable tool for assessing the overall strength of the legal framework in their country for RTI. The Rating also indicates the strengths and weaknesses of the legal framework in seven different categories, namely: Right of Access, Scope, Requesting Procedures, Exceptions and Refusals, Appeals, Sanctions and Protections, and Promotional Measures.

<http://www.rti-rating.org/index.html>

Where the Bribes Are Paid – Interactive Database

James Mintz Group, 2011

This interactive database compiles decades of data on violations and penalties under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the U.S. flagship legislation that makes bribery of foreign officials a crime. Since its inception, prosecutors have penalised over 200 companies under the FCPA in about 80 countries, amassing around \$4 billion in penalties. The database allows users to see how the total penalties amassed in each country. The data is also broken down by sectors, such as, Health, Defense, Manufacturing, Energy, Agriculture, Infrastructure, etc.

<http://www.fcmap.com/>

Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy

Global Financial Integrity, 2012

This report takes an in-depth look at the illicit financial flows out of Mexico from 1970-2010 and examines the underlying drivers and dynamics. It finds that a staggering US\$ 872 billion left Mexico over that 41 year period. The total capital flight represents approximately 5.2 percent of Mexico's GDP from 1970 - 2010. Illicit flows peaked in 1995 at 12.7 percent of GDP and average outflows increased sharply in each successive decade - they were \$3 billion in the 1970s, \$10.4 billion in the 1980s, \$17.4 billion in the 1990s, and \$49.6 billion in the decade ending 2009. The report finds that these illicit financial flows were generally the product of corruption, bribery and kickbacks, criminal activities, and tax evasion or avoidance.

<http://mexico.gfintegrity.org/en/>

EITI Reports: Results & Analysis

Revenue Watch Institute, 2012

As of September 2011, 28 countries in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) had published more than 50 reports covering over \$500 billion in payments. The Revenue Watch Institute has developed a set of tools which allows users to analyse revenue and payment data for all EITI reports to date and compare report data and quality across all countries. The data can be viewed by country, by year, or the quality of reports can be compared across indicators such as regularity, timeliness, disaggregation, coverage, etc.

<http://data.revenuewatch.org/eiti/>

UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION

Why Pay Bribes? Collective Action and Anti-Corruption Efforts

Monika Bahur & Naghmeh Nasiritousi, 2011

This paper makes an important contribution to the literature on corruption by drawing a new distinction between different kinds of corruption: need and greed. While most existing typologies and measures of corruption focus on the scale of corruption, this paper emphasises its character, and in particular, the basic motivations for engaging in corruption. Need-based corruption occurs when citizens pay a bribe for services they are legally entitled to, like health services. Greed-based corruption is about bribes that confer personal advantages which the citizen is not legally entitled to, such as paying an official for a government contract. The former entails extortion, as it involves an extra-legal premium on citizens' entitlements. The latter takes the form of collusion, as a number of actors work together for their mutual benefit. Looking at corruption in this way allows us to ask whether different forms of corruption have different effects on outcomes such as the relationship between government and citizens, levels of institutional trust and the effect of increased openness and transparency.

<http://tinyurl.com/87kc36z>

Food Assistance Integrity Study

Transparency International Kenya, 2012

Recent studies have identified food aid as one of the most 'at-risk' sectors from corruption and diversion, along with cash programming and post-disaster reconstruction. This study set out to analyse the integrity of food assistance in Kenya in relation to the 2011 drought. The main question explored by the study was the extent to which different food



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“Average outflows of illicit capital per annum [from Mexico] increased sharply throughout [1970 - 2010]. They were US\$3.0 billion in the 1970s, \$10.4 billion in the 1980s, \$17.4 billion in the 1990s, and \$49.6 billion in the decade ending 2009.”

- Global Financial Integrity, 2012

“...[T]he effectiveness of current anticorruption policy suffers from a focus on the scale of the corruption problem instead of type of corruption that is to be fought.”

- Bahur & Nasiritousi, 2011

HIGHLIGHTS IN CORRUPTION RESEARCH

“While firm-level research on corruption is still at the formative stage, findings suggest that disclosure is more than cheap talk... Firms with high anticorruption ratings have a lower frequency of subsequent allegations of corruption in the media, suggesting that disclosures reflect their commitment to fighting corruption.”

Paul Healy & George Serafeim, 2012

The Gateway project from Transparency International aims to collect, share and expand the knowledge on corruption assessment in collaboration with the broader anti-corruption community. It offers an online database of over 400 diagnostic tools, searchable by key criteria, and an accompanying set of topic guides on how to select and use diagnostic tools. For more information, please visit:

<http://gateway.transparency.org/>

UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION

assistance instruments in Kenya – in-kind, cash transfers and vouchers – posed different types of risks. The research covered four field studies and conducted over 100 interviews with humanitarian practitioners, local authorities and government representatives. The research team also held focus group discussions with over 200 beneficiaries at the community level, and carried out a desk-based review of key policy documentation and related literature. This report synthesises the findings from this research as well as input and feedback from the study's stakeholder group and other key informants.

<http://tinyurl.com/d4h5s6y>

Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark

Henrik Kleven et al., 2011

This article presents one of the first randomised studies on fiscal evasion. The authors examine the extent of fiscal evasion and the impact of randomised audits on tax evasion in Denmark. They find that hardly any income subject to third party reporting is evaded, while income not reported by third parties is largely evaded. They conclude that it is not unwillingness but inability to evade that prevents more fraud.

<http://tinyurl.com/d9gqfbg>

Political Polarisation as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-National Comparison

David S. Brown et al., 2011

While past research on political corruption has focussed on specific features of political institutions, such as electoral rules, electoral systems, and districts, in this paper the authors take a novel approach to understanding political corruption. They use panel data from a broad range of countries to support the theory that ideological polarisation can be used as a predictor of the perceived level of corruption within a country. Moreover, political polarisation itself can act as a constraint on corruption. The findings indicate that when the institutions are controlled by polarised political interests, the level of perceived corruption goes down. Therefore, designing policies that reduce corruption may not very effective in countries where there are no ideological checks on powerful interests in government.

<http://tinyurl.com/6pu3vhq>

FIGHTING CORRUPTION

Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes

Ana L. De La O et al., 2012

The authors of this paper probe the effects of information about corruption on electoral outcomes, focussing on how availability of such information influences voter participation and support for opposition parties. Building on existing research that shows that access to information serves as a mean to hold politicians accountable, the authors posit that while information about political corruption may indeed reduce support for corrupt incumbents, in certain conditions, it is also likely to decrease voter participation and support for political challengers. One of the paper's major contributions is that it extends our understanding of how information about political corruption influences electoral outcomes beyond the fate of political incumbents.

<http://voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/DP8790.pdf>

From Islands of Integrity to Understanding the Politics of Corruption Reduction

Caryn Peiffer, 2012

Under what circumstances does a reduction in the patterns of corruption occur? To what extent is this associated with changing structural conditions, or with formal or informal institutional change, or with more effective implementation? To what extent can it be attributed to the role of individuals, organisations and coalitions that pursue and promote reform? How do such factors combine? Why have some public organisations or sectors seen a reduction in corruption (or a greater reduction than might be expected) while others have not? In short, what are the political processes that drive corruption reduction and what policy lessons can be learned from studying cases where it has happened? This paper, the first in a series on this topic, is part of a project that seeks to answer these questions, and is being undertaken by the Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) in conjunction with Transparency International.

<http://tinyurl.com/d6qcxqn>

Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery

Christoph Engel et al., 2012

This paper presents a behavioural experiment designed to test the decision-making process

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around bribery according to punishment strategies. This experiment was conducted in Bonn and Shanghai with 192 students. The results suggest that within a legal framework supporting symmetric punishment, recipients are less inclined to grant the socially undesirable favour and bribers are more hesitant to offer the bribe. On the other hand, bribers tend to blow the whistle more often in asymmetric punishment regimes. From a policy perspective, the authors conclude that these two types of punishment regimes lead to a trade-off between deterrence and law enforcement.

http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2012_01online.pdf

Causes and Consequences of Firm Disclosures of Anticorruption Efforts Paul Healy & George Serafeim, 2012

This study examines 480 of the world's largest companies, using ratings by Transparency International of firms' public disclosures of strategy, policies, and management systems for combating corruption. The authors find that firm disclosures are related to enforcement and monitoring costs, such as home country enforcement, US listing, big four auditors, and prior enforcement actions. Disclosures also reflect industry and country corruption risks. Meanwhile, the financial implications of fighting disclosure are more nuanced.

<http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6977.html>



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FEATURED CURRICULUM

MULTINATIONALS AND CORRUPTION THE HAGUE UNIVERSITY

Developed by Professor Abiola Makinwa, this course introduces students to the international regulatory framework on corruption as it relates to multinational corporations (MNCs). Students examine areas where corruption poses a particular problem for the MNC with issues such as political lobbying, extortion by public officials, customs, and bribery by its agents and other intermediaries. Starting with the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, students examine the national, multilateral, regional and international instruments that circumscribe a corporation's dealings with foreign public officials in the effort to win international contracts. Furthermore methods of managing corruption as well as problems and prospects of current approaches to tackling corruption by MNCs are discussed.

Some sample modules and readings for the course are as follows:

Contextualising Issues of corruption and the MNC - Problem areas

Issues covered in this module are: political and charitable contributions, private to private bribery, extortion, customs, agents and intermediaries, and regulating the MNC on issues of corruption.

Sample readings include:

- P. T. Muchlinski, "Regulating Multinationals", in P.T. Muchlinski (ed), *Multinational Enterprises and the Law* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007) pp. 82 – 122.
- F. Heiman & F.Vincke, "Fighting Corruption – Political and Charitable Contribution", in *Fighting Corruption : International*

Corporate Integrity Handbook (ICC Publication, 2008) pp. 154 - 165

Understanding the FCPA as the basis of the international anti-corruption Framework

Issues covered in this module are: The history of the FCPA, inducement to obtain or retain business, foreign officials, exclusion of facilitation payments, jurisdiction, liability of parent companies and foreign subsidiaries, penalties, exceptions, and affirmative defences.

Sample readings for the module:

- M. Biegelman & D. Biegelman, *Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Guidebook* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2010) Chapters 1 & 2
- P. Cohen & A. Marriott, *International Corruption* (Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), Chapter 3

Managing Corruption - Understanding the issues involved in developing effective anti-corruption programmes

Issues covered in this module are: sensitive areas of MNC activity, principal elements of an effective anti-corruption programme, responsibilities of MNC, accounting, auditing and financial controls, and compliance.

Some sample readings include:

- F. Heiman & F.Vincke, "Fighting Corruption – Responsibilities of Enterprises", in *Fighting Corruption: International Corporate Integrity Handbook* (ICC Publication, 2008) pp. 67 – 83
- J. Bray, "Agents, consultants and joint-venture partners in international business transactions", in B. Errath (ed.), *Business Against Corruption – Case Stories and Examples* (UN Global Compact, 2006) pp. 108 – 118

ACRN as a teaching resource

Are you currently teaching or developing a course on corruption? Let your students know about ACRN by listing it as a resource in your course syllabus.

ACRN will not only enable students to keep up with the latest findings in their area of research interest, it will also help them locate upcoming academic conferences and find fellowships and job opportunities related to corruption and governance.

RESEARCH PROJECTS & MARKETPLACE

Anti-Corruption Research Paper Competition 2011 – winners announced!

The Anti-Corruption Research Paper Contest gives young scholars an opportunity to take up the challenge of filling important knowledge gaps in the field of corruption, present innovative approaches for measuring and understanding corruption, and showcase new findings. The contest is organised every year by *Transparency International*. This year's contest was also sponsored by the *Quality of Government Institute* and *The Institute for Security Studies*.

We are very pleased to announce that the winner of the 2011 research paper contest is **Yuhua Wang**. Yuhua is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His winning paper examines the influence of foreign investment on corruption in the Chinese judiciary.

For more information on the 2011 contest and short-listed papers, please visit:

<http://tinyurl.com/7fnwne8>

RESEARCH PROJECTS

Inauguration of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)

The High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, established by UNECA was inaugurated on 18th February 2012 at Johannesburg, South Africa. The panel will, amongst others, determine the nature, pattern, scope and channels of illicit financial outflows from the continent; sensitise African governments, citizens, policy makers, political leaders and development partners to the problem; mobilise support for putting in place rules, regulations, and policies to curb illicit financial outflows; and influence national, regional and international policies and programmes on addressing the problem of illicit financial outflows from Africa.

<http://tinyurl.com/787czsq>

Anti-Corruption in the Private Sector

Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance

The Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance is undertaking three projects that examine the issue of corruption in the private sector. These are: 1) Best practice on Anti-Corruption Incentives and Sanctions for Business, 2) A review of the Convention on Business Integrity in Nigeria, 3) UN Global Compact 10th Principle Sub-Working Group 'sport sponsoring and hospitalities'. The first project has recently completed a global expert survey on anti-corruption incentives and sanctions and has produced a list of broad range of practical incentives and sanctions that are likely to motivate businesses to engage against corruption.

<http://tinyurl.com/comvcvm>

TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES

Anti-corruption Centre for Education and Research (ACCERUS)

Stellenbosch University

The Anti-Corruption Centre for Education and Research at Stellenbosch University has developed a number of accredited courses and trainings for practitioners. These courses are designed specifically to impart knowledge, awareness, skills and the strategies necessary to introduce and enforce effective anti-corruption programmes in the typical public sector organisation.

<http://accerus.org/courses.aspx>

Transparency International Summer School on Integrity

Transparency International Lithuania & Mykolas Romeris University

The aim of the Summer School is to provide student leaders from across the region with an opportunity to learn first-hand from professionals working in the anti-corruption field. The Summer School seeks to provide students with a peer-to-peer learning and integrity-building platform that links international experience with transparency and integrity to the current situation in post-communist countries. The curriculum consists of three teaching modules covering the public sector, the private sector, and civic empowerment.

<http://transparencyschool.org/ti-summer-school/>

RESEARCH MARKETPLACE

Jobs and Consultancies

- **Research Fellow for the Global Corruption Report on Education**

Transparency International, Berlin, Germany

Applications are invited for appointment as Fellow for the Global Corruption Report on Education at Transparency International. The assignment will start as soon as possible and the duration is 2-3 months. Applicants should possess a post-graduate degree (Ph.D or pursuance of Ph.D desirable) with relevant research background and demonstrated ability to produce published work on corruption in education.

<http://tinyurl.com/clfd98c>

- **Senior Researcher: Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Programme**

Institute for Security Studies (ISS), South Africa

The Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Programme in Dakar is part of the ISS's African Conflict Prevention System that provides regional and continental conflict analysis and early warning to complement the early warning mechanisms of the African Union and ECOWAS. The successful candidate will be responsible for policy research, publications, dissemination and policy formulation in areas related to conflict dynamics and the political, social and security conditions in West Africa. Applications should be submitted by 27 April 2012.

<http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=31427>

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Jobs and Consultancies

- **Evaluation and Redesign of Research Methodology for the Transparency International Report on Enforcement of the OECD Convention against Foreign Bribery**

Transparency International, Berlin, Germany

The first TI Progress Report on the enforcement of the Convention was issued in 2005 and since then has been annually produced for seven years. The TI Progress Report is a comprehensive source of information regarding States Parties' enforcement of the Convention, making critical but constructive recommendations regarding prosecution of foreign bribery. The assignment is to conduct a comprehensive review of the TI Progress Report methodology and scope of research for future TI Progress Reports monitoring the implementation of the OECD Convention. The Consultant will develop and suggest to TI ways to improve the current method of producing the TI Progress Report. Applications are due by 10 April 2012

<http://tinyurl.com/7rn7x9>

Research Tenders and Funding

- **Comparative Research Networks 2012**

Department for International Development (DFID), United Kingdom

Within the framework of its strategy for building comparative knowledge on Africa produced from within the African continent, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) invites proposals from researchers based in African universities and centres of research for the constitution of Comparative Research Networks (CRNs) to undertake studies on or around any of the themes identified as priority research themes within the framework of the Council's strategic plan for the period 2012 – 2016. The primary purpose of CRNs is to encourage the development and consolidation of a comparative analytic perspective in the work of African social researchers. In so doing, it is hoped to establish a strong corpus of comparative studies produced by African scholars that could help to advance theoretical knowledge and discussion. Proposals are due by 15 June 2012.

<http://tinyurl.com/83qfj3z>

Calls for Papers

- **10th Workshop of the Study Group of the European Group of Public Administration (EGPA) On Ethics and Integrity of Governance**

University of Leuven, Belgium

The Study Group on Ethics and Integrity of Governance brings together academics and practitioners interested in the ethical dimension of administration and organisation. The aim of the annual sessions is to present an overview of the cutting-edge academic research on ethics and integrity of governance with relevance for the practice of European governance and government. Deadline for submissions is 05 May 2012.

<http://egpa-conference2012.org/>

- **Corruption at the Grassroots-Level - Between Temptation, Norms, and Culture**

Journal of Economics and Statistics

The macroeconomic correlates of corruption are well understood and well researched. Empirical evidence on the micro level, however, is still far from being exhaustive. In particular, it is not clear to what extent empirical results of interesting case studies - both experimental and micro-econometric - are specific to the cultural or normative context in which they have been derived. This special issue is devoted to furthering our understanding of the extent of context-specificity of empirical results on corruption. Submissions are due by 01 December 2012.

<http://tinyurl.com/ceejuzf>

Upcoming Events

- **Workshop on Tax Avoidance, Corruption, and Economic Crisis**

Essex University, 5-6 July 2012

This workshop will explore connections between tax avoidance, corruption and crisis. The themes explored within this remit can include issues such as how tax avoidance harms progressive tax systems, distorts markets and infringes human rights; the role of financial professionals in promoting financial and legal secrecy; and how secrecy jurisdictions have contributed to economic, financial, political and social crises around the world.

<http://tinyurl.com/bpjke5>



Have you been to an interesting conference lately?

*Share your thoughts on new frontiers of corruption research with the global anti-corruption community by **blogging** for the ACRN website.*

For more information, write to us at:
acrn_editor@transparency.org